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I. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Noncompeition Covenants
The Texas Supreme Court considered whether a lease covenant for non-
competition was void as a violation of Texas antitrust laws' in City Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Berman.2 In City Products the landlord, a limited
partnership, executed a lease to the tenant, a variety store, that contained a
protective covenant prohibiting the landlord from leasing any part of the
building or any other space in another building of the landlord located
within 1,000 feet of the variety store to a business similar to that of the
tenant.3 The landlord did not own the realty but had the right to lease the
premises.4 Berman, one of the general partners of the limited partnership,
leased a building that was within 1,000 feet of the variety store to a com-
peting variety store, Perry Brothers, Inc. The tenant filed suit against
Berman, Perry Brothers, and all of the landlord partners to enforce the
noncompetition covenant and for damages. Berman and Perry Brothers
* B.B.A., The University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Kleberg, Dyer, Redford & Weil, Corpus Christi, Texas.
I. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon 1968).
2. 610 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1980).
3. The covenant provided:
That the Landlord will not, during the term hereof, or any renewal or exten-
sion hereof, lease or permit to be used, any portion of the building in which
demised premises are situated or any portion of any other building or prem-
ises controlled by the landlord located within one thousand (1000) feet of the
herein demised premises, for any business similar to the business of the Ten-
ant, that is to say, for any variety store or any business conducted under the
name of a five and ten cent store, five cents to one dollar store, or similar
name.
Id. at 447.
4. The original lease was executed in 1958 by the Estate of Abe Levy, the Estate of Ike
Levy, and Max Berman. The term of the lease was extended three times by supplemental
agreements. The extension in question, the third supplemental agreement, listed as landlord
Freda Levy, I. A. Loeb, Fannie Loeb, Max Berman, Sydell Berman, Morris L. Siegel, Helen
Siegel, William Sheridan, and Hattie Sheridan as general partners doing business as A & I
Levy Estates, a limited partnership. Morris Siegel and William Sheridan did not own any of
the realty; their wives, however, were owners. Id.
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defended, claiming that the covenant violated the Texas antitrust statute as
an illegal combination and was therefore void. The trial court rejected the
antitrust defenses, enjoined the competing variety store, and awarded pu-
nitive damages.5 The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the cov-
enant violated section 15.04 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 6
Addressing the issue of whether the noncompetition covenant violated
section 15.04,7 the supreme court noted its decision in Schnitzer v. South-
west Shoe Corp. 8 In Schnitzer the court found that an agreement between
two merchants who owned adjoining property that restricted the use by
one merchant's tenant violated the antitrust laws.9 The Berman court
noted, however, that restrictions were permissible in certain situations;
quoting its decision in Schnitzer, the court stated:
One of the exceptional situations is that in which an owner, lessor or
one in control of premises agrees with another person that the other
person shall have an exclusive right or privilege on the premises or
that the other person will sell on the premises only the products or
merchandise of the owner. . . Contracts or agreements of this char-
acter are upheld when they are collateral or incidental to a lawful
lease or grant of premises in which the lessor or grantor has a property
interest.10
Relying on the Schnitzer decision, the court stated that it would be permis-
sible for a lessor to covenant not to compete with a lessee and for a lessor,
within reason, to covenant not to use or permit use of his other property by
others in competition with the lessee. ' Despite the fact that the partner-
ship did not own the property, the court concluded that the partnership
was a lessor or one in control of the property and, therefore, could bind the
partners to the noncompetition covenant.' 2 The court, therefore, holding
that the covenant did not violate the antitrust statutes, reversed that part of
the decision of the court of civil appeals.' 3 In addition, the court upheld
the civil appeals decision holding that punitive damages were not allowa-
ble without proof of actual damages.14
During the survey period, the court of civil appeals also considered the
5. 610 S.W.2d at 447-48.
6. 579 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979).
7. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon 1968) provides:
(a) Every monopoly, trust, and conspiracy in restraint of trade, as defined in
Sections 15.01, 15.02, and 15.03 of this code, respectively, is illegal and
prohibited....
(b) An agreement violating the prohibition against a monopoly, trust, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade contained in Subsection (a) of this section is
void and unenforceable in law or equity.
8. 364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1963).
9. Id. at 374-75.
10. 610 S.W.2d at 448 (citing Schnitzer, 364 S.W.2d at 374-75).
11. 610 S.W.2d at 448.
12. Id. at 449. See also Kroger v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1964, writ ref d n.r.e.) (trial court's injunction of supermarket pursuant to
noncompetition agreement in lease reversed).




application of an exclusionary lease covenant in Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc. v. Alamo Savings Association. 15 In Bache the lessee, a stock
brokerage firm, relocated within San Antonio in order to "get away from"
its competitor, Merrill Lynch. When Bache moved, it was informed of the
landlord's plan to build an adjoining tower connected by an atrium to the
building containing Bache's new offices. The lease contained an exclusion-
ary clause that provided that the lessor "does hereby grant [Bache] the
right to exclude any company engaged in the securities brokerage business
as lessee from the Alamo Savings Tower and the Gunter Hotel Prem-
ises." 16 The lessor changed its plans and did not connect the two build-
ings. After completion of the new tower, the landlord leased space in the
new building to Merrill Lynch.
Thereafter, Bache filed suit to enforce its exclusionary clause. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the lessor on the grounds that the
clause applied only to Bache's building. The court of civil appeals deter-
mined that the clause contained a latent ambiguity and, therefore, proof of
the surrounding facts and circumstances were admissible to ascertain the
true intent of the parties.17 The court remanded the case to allow the in-
troduction of evidence of the surrounding circumstances to help determine
the intent of the parties as to the effect of the exclusionary clause.1 8
B. Ad Valorem Taxes on Leasehold Estate
The Amarillo court of civil appeals considered whether a tenant was
liable for ad valorem taxes on the leasehold estate in A. J Robbins & Co. v.
Roberts.19 The landlord and tenant in Robbins entered into a purchase
contract whereby the tenant agreed to buy substantially all of the assets of
a lumber company. They also entered into a lease agreement covering the
real property of the business. The purchase contract contained a provision
calling for the proration of the ad valorem taxes to the date of the clos-
ing.20 The lease, however, did not contain any language addressing ad
valorem taxes. After consummation of the sale and lease and upon the
receipt of the tax statements for the leasehold premises, the landlord re-
quested the tenant to pay the ad valorem taxes. When the tenant refused,
the landlord filed suit. The trial court, reading the contract and lease to-
gether as a single transaction, held the tenant liable for the taxes.2 '
In its decision, the court of civil appeals noted that under Texas law the
owner of realty was liable for ad valorem taxes22 and moreover a lessee
15. 611 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
16. Id. at 707.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 708.
19. 610 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. Id. at 855. The clause provided: "All ad valorem taxes.., shall be prorated be-
tween the parties down to the date of closing." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 855-56. The court cited TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7171 (Vernon 1960)
(repealed 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1982).
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was not liable for taxes merely because of possession. 23 The court recog-
nized, however, that a lessee may become liable for payment of ad valorem
taxes by contractual agreement with the lessor.24 If a lessor and lessee so
contract, the lessor still remains ultimately liable for the taxes but is enti-
tled to maintain an action against the lessee for the tax payment. 25 The
landlord contended that the purchase contract and the lease should be read
as one document because they represented a single transaction, and that
the tax proration provision contained in the purchase contract, therefore,
provided the contractual basis for shifting the tax liability to the tenant.
The court of civil appeals disagreed, holding that despite the fact that the
two documents represented one transaction and should be construed to-
gether,26 a paragraph from one document could not be transplanted into
the other document because each contract was complete in itself having its
own separate purpose.27 The court holding for the tenant, therefore, found
that the tax proration clause contained in the purchase contract applied
only to the personalty and not to the realty. 28
C. Obligation to Repair
The court of civil appeals affirmed a trial court decision that held that a
lease provision requiring the lessor to pay for repairs did not require the
lessor to make the needed repairs in National Living Centers, Inc. v. Cities
Realty Corp. 29 The lessee leased a building for use as a nursing home.
Consequently, the building was required to meet certain standards in order
to acquire the requisite state license. 30 The lease contained a provision
23. Id. at 856.
24. 610 S.W.2d at 856 (citing Dependable Motors, Inc. v. Smith, 433 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1968 writ refd n.r.e.) (lessee held liable for ad valorem tax increases as
provided in lease)).
25. 610 S.W.2d at 856.
26. The court cited with approval the holding in Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 341, 321
S.W.2d 62, 65 (1959), which stated:
It is well settled that separate instruments executed at the same time, between
the same parties, and relating to the same subject matter may be considered
together and construed as one contract. This undoubtedly is sound in princi-
ple when the several instruments are truely parts of the same transaction and
together form one entire agreement. It is, however, simply a device for ascer-
taining and giving effect to the intention of the parties and cannot be applied
arbitrarily and without regard to the realities of the situation.
610 S.W.2d at 856.
27. 610 S.W.2d at 856-57. The court determined that the contracts did not need to be
read together in order to ascertain a single contractual obligation. Id. at 856. The court
discussed Government Personnel Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wear, 247 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio), modifiedon other grounds, 151 Tex. 454, 251 S.W.2d 525 (1952), which
read several contracts together in order to understand the entire transaction. 610 S.W.2d at
857. Furthermore, the court quoted Lawrence v. United States, 378 F.2d 452, 461 (5th Cir.
1967), which stated: "Thus, while recognizing that two or more separate agreements exe-
cuted contemporaneously are to be construed together, perhaps even as one instrument, this
does not mean that all are bodily consolidated into one instrument so that every provision in
one instrument thereby becomes a part of every other instrument." 610 S.W.2d at 857.
28. 610 S.W.2d at 857.
29. 619 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
30. A skilled care nursing home is required to have a license and approval from the
[Vol. 36
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that referred to the licensing requirement and stated that the lessor must
bear the expense of any alterations or repairs required for licensing.3' The
lessee contended that the lease created an affirmative duty upon the lessor
to make the necessary repairs. The court of appeals disagreed, stating that
there was a difference between a covenant to make repairs and a covenant
to pay for repairs. 32 The lessee also contended the lessor was estopped
from avoiding the duty to make repairs because the landlord had volunta-
rily undertaken to make repairs. Again, the court disagreed, holding that
the voluntary making of repairs did not constitute an admission or evi-
dence of a duty to make the repairs. 33 Moreover, the court found that the
making of repairs did not create a new agreement to make repairs. 34 In
addition, there was no allegation or evidence of detrimental reliance, an
essential element of estoppel; the court of appeals, therefore, found a clear
distinction between the obligation to pay for repairs and the obligation to
make repairs. 35
D. Forfeiture
The Texas Supreme Court reversed a forfeiture under a lease in Pitman
v. Sanditen.36 In Pitman the tenant purchased the buildings, equipment,
improvements, and personal property of a Laredo hotel and leased the
underlying real estate. The lease agreement contained an option to
purchase. After extensive renovation of the hotel, the tenant exercised his
option to buy the property. The agreement provided, "a contract shall ex-
ist between lessor and lessee for the sale and purchase of the Real Estate"
when the option was exercised. 37 The parties agreed to close by mail mak-
ing March 1 the closing date. The transaction was not closed on March 1;
consequently, the landlord refused to close unless he received the rental
payment due on March 1. Upon the tenant's refusal to pay the March
rent, the landlord terminated the lease according to the lease provisions
that allowed termination for nonpayment of rent.
The landlord sued seeking a declaratory judgment that the lease was
terminated and that the tenant thereby forfeited his interest in the lease-
hold and the improvements. The tenant counterclaimed for specific per-
formance of his option. The trial court and court of civil appeals
determined that the lease was terminated, and that the tenant had forfeited
his interest. 38 The supreme court, reversing, held that the lease termina-
State Department of Health. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4442c (Vernon 1976 &
Supp. 1982).
31. 619 S.W.2d at 424. The provision made licensing a contingency of the lease, al-
lowed the lessor to seek the license if the lessee failed, and provided a formula by which to
reduce the rent if the license ultimately permitted less than 70 beds. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 425.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 626 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. 1982).
37. Id. at 496-97.
38. Pitman v. Sanditen, 611 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980).
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tion and forfeiture provisions did not apply because the landlord tenant
relationship ceased upon the exercising of the option.39 Finding that the
lease provisions for forfeiture did not apply to the vendor purchaser rela-
tionship created by the exercise of the option, the court, therefore, granted
specific performance of the option.40
E. Assignment of Rent
In Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Wy-Tex Livestock Co.41 a landlord as-
signed the right to receive rents from its tenant to a bank in consideration
for a loan. The bank notified the tenant of the assignment and, thereafter,
the tenant made rental payments to the bank. Subsequently, a garnishing
creditor of the landlord filed suit to obtain the rentals claiming that the
assignment was a security interest, and that the bank as assignee was re-
quired, under the Business and Commerce Code, to file a financing state-
ment in order to perfect its interest.42 The court of appeals held that the
assignment was absolute, and that the assignee was not required to file a
financing statement under section 9 of the Business and Commerce Code
because section 9 did not apply to rents payable under a real property
lease.43
F Venue
In Friday v. Grant Plaza Huntsville Associates" the Texas Supreme
Court considered the proper venue site for a lessor to bring suit against two
guarantors of a lessee for unpaid rent under a written lease agreement.
The lessor brought suit in the county where the property was located, and
the lessee and guarantors filed pleas of privilege to be sued in the county of
their residence. The trial court denied their pleas, and the court of appeals
affirmed. 45 In addition, the court of appeals held that the guarantors were
necessary parties. 46 Only the guarantors appealed the court of appeals'
decision; therefore, the supreme court decision does not address venue as
to the lessee. The supreme court reversed as to the guarantors, holding
that because the written lease agreement and the guaranty did not contain
a location for payment of the rent, the proper venue was the residence of
the guarantors.47 Further, the court held that the guarantors were not nec-
essary parties.48
39. 626 S.W.2d at 498.
40. Id.
41. 611 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.102(b), 9.401(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
43. 611 S.W.2d at 171. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(10) (Vernon Supp.
1982); In re Bristol Assoc., Inc., 505 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1974) (assignment of rents under a
lease excluded from operation of article 9 of U.C.C.).
44. 610 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1980).
45. Id. at 748.
46. Id.
47. id. at 749. The court held that TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1982), fixing venue in county named in contract, did not apply. 610 S.W.2d at 749.




The Austin court of civil appeals addressed the validity of an exculpa-
tory clause in Porter v. Lumbermen's Investment Corp. 49 In Porter a tenant
brought an action against his landlord for injuries he sustained by falling
through a plate glass door.50 The lease, which was in writing, contained an
exculpatory clause absolving the landlord of any liability for injury to the
lessee. 5' Based on the landlord's affirmative defense of the exculpatory
clause, the trial court granted summary judgment for the landlord. The
tenant appealed, alleging that the exculpatory clause was invalid as an ad-
hesion contract and, citing to the decision of Kamarath v. Bennett5 2 that
recognized the warranty of habitability, that the clause was against public
policy. The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judg-
ment, stating that clauses exculpating a landlord from future negligence
liability were generally upheld.53 Further, the court stated that such
clauses were invalid when there is a gross disparity of bargaining power,
but not when, as here, the tenant failed to plead and offer proof of any
gross disparity of bargaining power.54 In addition, the court noted that the
warranty of habitability did not apply to a personal injury case involving a
landlord and tenant; rather, the cause of action must arise from some the-
ory of negligence. 55
H Security Deposits
In A. B. Investment Corp. v. Dorman5 6 a tenant sued his landlord for
§ 29a (Vernon 1964), fixing venue against all necessary parties where proper against any
defendant, did not apply because relief was obtainable without the joinder of the guarantors.
610 S.W.2d at 749-50.
49. 606 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
50. Id. at 716. The tenant in Porter was a member of a law firm that was the lessee
under the lease. The fact that the tenant was a lawyer may have had some bearing on the
court's decision involving disparity in bargaining position.
51. The exculpatory clause provided:
12. NON-LIABILITY OF LESSOR: Neither Lessor, its agents, employees
and/or servants shall be liable for any damage or injury to Lessee, its agents,
employees, servants, guests and/or licensee's [sic] or to any person entering
the premises or the building of which the demised premises are a part or to
goods or chattels therein which result from any defect in the structure or the
equipment of which the demised premises are a part, nor shall Lessor or its
agents, employees, or servants be liable for any damage caused to Lessee, its
agents, employees, servants, guests and/or licensee's [sic], by other Lessees or
persons in said building or for interference with light or other incorporeal her-
editaments, or caused by operations in construction of any public or quasi-
public work, nor for any latent defect in the building.
Id.
52. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
53. 606 S.W.2d at 717.
54. Id.
55. Id. See generally Katz, Real Property-Landlord & Tenant, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 85, 95 (1979); McSwain & Butler, The Landlord's Statutory Duty to Re-
pair-Article 5236f The Legislative Response to Kamarath v. Benett, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 4
(1980); Comment, Recent Statutory Developments in Texas Landlord-Tenant Law: A4 Sword
Without a Shield, 35 Sw. L.J. 645 (1981).
56. 604 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
1982]
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failing to return his security deposit within thirty days as prescribed by
article 5236e.57 In order for the retention of a security deposit to constitute
a violation of the statute the court must find "bad faith" on the part of the
landlord.58 The trial court found that the landlord had acted in bad faith
in not returning the deposit within the statutory period because the land-
lord had not developed a method by which to expediently return security
deposits. The court awarded damages to the tenant in the amount of triple
his deposit plus $100.00 and attorney's fees.
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the
trial court, concluding that the trial judge erred in finding bad faith.59 In
discussing the meaning of bad faith, the court noted its decision in Wilson
v. O'Conner 60 that had found "that 'bad faith' implies an intention to de-
prive the tenant of the refund lawfully due."' 61 Further, the court noted,
intentional retention alone would not establish bad faith even though the
burden was on the landlord to overcome the presumption of bad faith.62
The court concluded that as a matter of law, the failure to have a system to
timely return the deposits was not bad faith, and that the trial judge had
failed to reach the issue of bad faith.63 The court, therefore, remanded the
case to the trial court.64
I. Landlord's Lien
A tenant brought suit against a landlord for willfully excluding the ten-
ant from her apartment,65 for seizing exempt property under a landlord's
lien,66 and for misrepresenting the landlord's rights67 in Causey v. Cal-
lett.68 The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in favor
of the landlord with respect to the wrongful exclusion and misrepresenta-
tion, but reversed and remanded on the point of seizure of exempt prop-
erty.69 The landlord had locked out the tenant and seized a deep freeze
under his landlord's lien because of the nonpayment of rent. The landlord
contended the deep freeze was not exempt under article 5236d, § 2 as
"kitchen furniture and utensils" because the exemption applied only to
necessary kitchen items and not to luxury items such as a deep freeze.70
57. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e (Vernon Supp. 1982).
58. Section 4(a) of article 5236e provides:
A landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this Act is
liable for $100 plus treble the amount of that portion of the deposit which was
wrongfully withheld from the tenant, and shall be liable for reasonable attor-
neys fees in a law suit to recover the security deposit.
59. 604 S.W.2d at 508.
60. 555 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd).
61. 604 S.W.2d at 508 (citing 555 S.W.2d at 780).
62. 604 S.W.2d at 508.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236c, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
66. Id. art. 5236d.
67. See TEX. BUs. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
68. 605 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
69. Id. at 719.
70. Id. at 720; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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The court held that as a matter of law the deep freeze was exempt property
as kitchen furniture and utensils because the statute did not contain any
limitation as to value or use of item.7' The court, therefore, held that the
landlord had violated the statute by seizing the deep freeze. 72 Further-
more, the court held that the statute did not require knowledge on the part
of the landlord that the seizure was unlawful. 73
J Remedies and Damages
The Houston [14th District] court of civil appeals considered whether a
landlord's "Notice to Quit" letter constituted a forfeiture of its rights under
the lease in Crain v. Southern Warehouse Corp. 74 Upon the tenant's failure
to pay rent, the landlord sent a letter to the tenant, entitled "Notice to
Quit," that instructed the tenant to pay overdue rent within three days or
surrender possession of the premises. The tenant moved out. Nearly two
years later, after being unable to relet the premises, the landlord brought
suit to recover accrued rent to the date of suit. The tenant contended that
the landlbrd had elected its remedy and forfeited its rights under the lease
by its Notice to Quit letter. The court, however, held that the letter did not
declare the lease forfeited as did the letter in Rohrt v. Kelly Manufacturing
Co. 75 Furthermore, the lease in Crain contained a clause that expressly
allowed the landlord to pursue any remedy without forfeiture or waiver of
any rent due.76 The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's decision
granting the accrued rental to the landlord.77 The tenant also questioned
the measure of damages, alleging that it should have been the difference
between the present value of the rentals contracted for and the reasonable
cash market value of the lease for the unexpired term. The court disagreed
holding that the tenant's measure of damages would be proper if the land-
lord had sued for anticipatory breach and had not relet.78 The proper
measure of damages was found to be the entire contractual amount be-
cause the landlord had attempted to relet the premises, and a lease agree-
ment clause specifically allowed the landlord to recover all loss and
damage caused by the termination of the lease. 79
71. 605 S.W.2d at 720.
72. Id.
73. Id ,
74. 612 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
75. Id. at 285. See Rohrt v. Kelly Mfg. Co., 162 Tex. 534, 349 S.W.2d 95, 97 (1961).
(landlord's letter specifically stated that the lease was forfeited).
76. 612 S.W.2d at 285. The court in Rohrt noted that a lease may expressly allow reen-
try by the lessor without affecting the obligations for the unexpired term. 162 Tex. at 538,
349 S.W.2d at 98. The lease in Crain provided, "nor shall pursuit of any remedy herein
provided constitute a forfeiture or waiver of any rent due to landlord hereunder ... " 612
S.W.2d at 285.
77. 612 S.W.2d at 285.
78. Id.
79. Id. The lease provided:
[Landlord may] terminate this Lease, in which event Tenant shall immediately
surrender the premises to the Landlord . . . and Tenant agrees to pay the
Landlord on demand the amount of all loss and damage which Landlord may
1982]
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The Texas Supreme Court addressed the liability of the State Commis-
sion for the Blind under a written lease as a holdover tenant in State v. City
National Bank.80 The Commission occupied space owned by the bank
under a written lease agreement. At the end of the term, the Commission,
unable to find space elsewhere, remained in possession for an additional
thirteen months without paying rent. The bank sued the Commission for a
money judgment for the holdover. The trial court granted judgment for
the bank and the court of civil appeals affirmed.8' Holding that under the
terms of the contract the bank was entitled to recover the reasonable rental
value for the holdover period, the supreme court affirmed.82 The court
relied on the terms of the lease that provided for delivery of possession
upon termination or default and remedies for recovery of rent and dam-
ages.8 3 By finding the Commission liable under the written lease, the court
avoided discussing state laws that might limit the liability of the
Commission.84
K Legislation
The 67th Texas Legislature passed several laws affecting landlord and
tenant relations.85 A landlord's lien is provided for the lessor of a self-
storage facility on all the property stored in the facility for payment of
suffer by reason of such termination, whether through inability to relet the
premises on satisfactory terms or otherwise.
d.
80. 603 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1980).
81. State v. City Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 155, 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979).
82. 603 S.W.2d at 765.
83. Id. The lease agreement provided:
[O]n termination of this lease ... lessee shall deliver up the premises .... In
the event lessee shall be in default in the payment of rentals ... or shall
otherwise breach its covenants or obligations and shall be and remain in de-
fault for a period of 30 days after notice from lessor to it of such default, lessor
shall have the right and privilege of terminating the lease ... and of entering
upon and taking possession ... and shall have the remedies now or hereafter
provided by law for recovery of rent, repossession of the premises and dam-
ages occasioned by such default .... Lessee shall have the remedies now or
hereafter provided by law for recovery of rent, .... and damages occasioned
by such default.
Id.
84. Id. at 766. The State contended that:(1) The bank's claim arises from a transaction which is not provided for by
pre-existing law as required by Article III, Section 44 of the Texas Constitu-
tion; (2) Article 666b, I prohibits the State Commission for the Blind from con-
tracting with the Bank to pay rental for the holdover period; and (3) this
Article prevents the State from being liable on an implied contract or quan-
tum meruit.
1. Article 666b was repealed by Acts of the 66th Legislature, 1979. The leas-
ing of building space is now covered by Article 601b, Section 6.01. This sec-
tion allows leasing by negotiation under some circumstances with the consent
of the Agency.
Id. at 766 and n. 1.
85. This section is intended to describe the topics of recent legislative acts only briefly.




overdue rent and charges by section 4 of article 5238b.86 In addition, if
there is a written contractual agreement between the lessor and lessee that
includes a clause that is underlined or printed in conspicuous bold print
providing for a landlord's lien and if the landlord complies with the other
notice requirements, the landlord may seize and sell the property without
judicial foreclosure. 87 Article 5236h requires a landlord of a residential
dwelling unit to install, change, or rekey a security device after written
request by the tenant.88 Another new statute, article 5236i, requires a land-
lord to disclose the name and address of the owner of the dwelling unit
and of any property management company that manages the unit to the
tenant upon request.8 9 Article 5236g allows a landlord to terminate a writ-
ten or oral lease entered into or renewed after June 15, 1981, if the tenant
uses the premises for an activity that is indecent and the tenant is so con-
victed under chapter 43 of the Penal Code. 90 Lastly, the legislature passed
article 5236j that requires a landlord to install a smoke detector outside of
each bedroom in all dwelling units constructed after September 1, 1981,
and to install by September 1, 1984, at least one smoke detector in all
dwelling units constructed before September 1, 1981. 91
II. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
A. Statutory Lien
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an appeal by an industry
owner and a corporate surety from a district court decision granting recov-
ery for two subcontractors based on mechanics' and materialmen's liens
and upon the surety's bond in Thermo Tech, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co. 92 In reversing the district court's decision, the court of appeals
found that the district court had erred in finding a lien in favor of one of
the subcontractors because the subcontractor had not filed a lien affidavit
within the statutory period prescribed by articles 5453 and 5469. 93 The
subcontractor sought to extend the date for filing by arguing that the own-
er had failed to retain for its benefit ten percent of all of the funds due to
all of the contractors on the project.94 Disagreeing, the court determined
that the contractor's contention was incorrect because after the Texas
86. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. Am. art. 5238b, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
87. Id. § 5(b).
88. Id. art. 5236h.
89. Id. art. 5236i.
90. Id. art. 5236g. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.01-.24 (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1982) (prohibition against various crimes relating to prostitution and obscenity).
91. TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236j (Vernon Supp. 1982).
92. 643 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1981).
93. Id. at 1177-79; see TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5453, 5469 (Vernon Supp.
1982). Article 5453 provides that a lien affidavit must be filed not later than 90 days after the
tenth day of the next month after the materials are delivered. Article 5469 provides that the
lien affidavit must be filed within 30 days after the work by the contractor is completed.
94. 643 F.2d at 1178. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Vernon Supp. 1982),
which requires the owner to retain 10% of the contract price until 30 days after the comple-
tion of the work.
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Supreme Court's decision in Hayek v. Western Steel Co. 95 the legislature
amended the statute to clearly provide that the owner's duty to retain
funds for the subcontractors was calculated with respect to the individual
contractor through which the subcontractor claims. 96 In addition, the
court found, as had the trial court, that the other subcontractor had not
filed his lien affidavit within the statutory period.97 The subcontractor ar-
gued, however, that the date for filing was extended beyond that found by
the court because he had supplied scaffolding which was used to a later
date and he thus had supplied materials until that later date.98 The court
found, however, that the date of supplying materials was unimportant for
article 5469 purposes. 99 In addition, the court found that the contractor
had not complied with article 5463 that requires notice to be sent periodi-
cally when the materials are supplied over a period of time.l°° The court
of appeals also reversed the district court's finding that the owner and
surety were liable because they were estopped from denying there was a
"payment" bond.101 The owner had in fact purchased a "performance"
bond that would pay subcontractors only in the event they had perfected a
valid lien. Since a purchase order from the owner to the contractor re-
quired the contractor to get a "payment and performance bond," the dis-
trict court formulated its estoppel theory on the basis that the purchase
order was an implicit representation to the subcontractor that such a bond
existed.10 2 The court of appeals found that estoppel did not apply because
the subcontractor had not met his duty to reasonably inquire into the exist-
ence of the bond. 10 3 The court, therefore, found that the subcontractor
could recover only as a general creditor against the funds retained by the
owner. 104
95. 478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972) (holding that the owner was required to retain 10% of
all the funds due to all contractors).
96. 643 F.2d at 1178. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452(2)(d) (Vernon Supp.
1982); McKalip v. Smith Bldg. & Masonry Supply, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (amendment of art. 5452 limits retainage funds to 10% of partic-
ular original contract). See generally Note, Duty of Owners Without General Contractors to
Establish Mechanics' and Alaterialmen's Lien Retainage Funds in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REV.
185 (1973).
97. 643 F.2d at 1178.
98. Id. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452(2)(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (includ-
ing use of construction equipment in definition of "material").
99. 643 F.2d at 1178-79.
100. Id. at 1179. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5463, 5453(2) (Vernon Supp.
1982). See generally Youngblood, Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J.
665, 676-87 (1972).
101. 643 F.2d at 1179-80.
102. Id. at 1179.
103. Id. at 1179-80. The court distinguished the present case from those estoppel cases in
which a party has no duty to inquire into the representation. Id. at 1180. See Cooper Petro.
Co. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 436 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Tex. 1969) (when vice president in-
duced extension of credit by promising president's guaranty, president estopped to deny);
Traylor v. Gray, 547 S.W.2d 644, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ reftd n.r.e.)
(when no facts made it reasonable for seller to investigate into promise of third party that
buyer would honor contract, buyer estopped to assert otherwise).
104. 643 F.2d at 1181.
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In Reliable Life Insurance Co. v. Brown & Root, Inc. 105 Brown & Root,
as contractor, brought suit against Houston Leisure Park Company, as
owner, for labor and materials expended in the construction of a recrea-
tional vehicle camp and for foreclosure of its liens against the property.
Brown & Root also sued Reliable Life Insurance Company in order to
establish the priority of Brown & Root's lien. 10 6 Affirming the trial court's
decision in favor of Brown & Root, the court of civil appeals found that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury finding of substantial per-
formance of the contract.' 0 7 In addition, the court determined that the lien
affidavit had been filed within the requisite 120-day period.108 Reaching
this decision necessitated that the court determine when the 120-day pe-
riod began to run. The court, therefore, set out the four alternative events
that might trigger the running of the period.' 0 9 Although stating that a
breach by the owner could be such an event, the court determined that the
contractor, after the owner's breach, could continue the work until comple-
tion and the completion date would be the date when the accrual of the
indebtedness arose." 0 The court found that allowing the completion date
rather than the date of the breach to control was consistent with the princi-
ple that the lien statutes should be liberally construed to protect the con-
tractor."' In determining the priority of Brown & Root's lien over that of
Reliable Life Insurance Company, the court discussed commencement of
construction in light of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Diversified
Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock, General Contractor, Inc. 112 and
equitable subrogation." 3 The court determined that under Blaylock, the
clearing of the land by Brown & Root was commencement of construction
and constituted the inception of the mechanic's lien as a matter of law."1
4
As to Reliable's claim of equitable subrogation, the court determined that
105. 607 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. Reliable had a deed of trust lien on the property. Id. at 624.
107. Id. at 627. The text of the case contains a lengthy recitation of Brown & Root's
performance. Id. at 625-29.
108. Id. at 627-28. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANNi. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (lien
affidavit required to be filed within 120 days of the accrual of the indebtedness).
109. 607 S.W.2d at 627. The four events were the following: "(1) breach by the owner,
(2) abandonment by the contractor, (3) completion of the project, or (4) final settlement."
See TEx. REV. Cir. STAT. ANN. art. 5467 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
110. 607 S.W.2d at 627.
111. Id.
112. 56 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1978). The court stated:
The Supreme Court held in Blaylock that under the "commencement of con-
struction" requirement of Art. 5459, the inception of a Mechanic's and Materi-
alman's lien occurs when the "activity commenced" is actually conducted on
the land, is visible on the land, and when it constitutes an activity that is either
defined as an "improvement" under the Texas statute or involves the excava-
tion for or laying of a foundation for a building. The word "improvement"
specifically includes the "clearing, grubbing . . . of land," Art. 5452; and so
the Supreme Court held in Blaylock that such activity was sufficient to consti-
tute inception of the mechanic's lien.
607 S.W.2d at 627.
113. 607 S.W.2d at 628-31.
114. Id. at 629.
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the implied findings made by the trial court were sufficient to support the
conclusion that Reliable did not have a prior lien by equitable subroga-
tion.' 1 5 Lastly, the court determined that any question as to the amount of
recovery above the contract price by Brown & Root was waived because of
the failure to raise any objection to the evidence of damage submitted by
Brown & Root. 116
In First National Bank v. Sledge117 the owner of two lots originally con-
tracted with Harris to build a house on each. The owner executed two
mechanic's and materialman's lien contracts and notes that Harris subse-
quently assigned, without indorsement, to the bank, and the bank recorded
the assignment. Thereafter, the contractor completed one house but aban-
doned work on the other, filed for bankruptcy, and received a discharge.
Sledge and each of the other subcontractors of Harris who had worked on
or provided materials for the construction filed a "Statement Securing
Mechanic's and Materialman's Lien Against Owner" in the county
mechanic's and materialman's lien records, and each sent one copy of his
affidavit to the owner. The bank sued the subcontractors and the owner to
have the liens removed or declared inferior. The subcontractors cross-
claimed for establishment of their statutory liens, foreclosure, and for at-
torney's fees, costs and interest. Upon a motion, the court discharged the
liens after receiving into its registry twice the amount of the claims from
the owner and the bank. The court then granted summary judgment
against the owner. The court of civil appeals reversed in an unpublished
opinion." l8 Thereafter, a trial was held on the merits, and judgment was
granted for the subcontractors." 9 On appeal, the bank and the owner con-
tended that the subcontractors had not complied with the statutory re-
quirements for perfecting their liens. The court concluded that the
subcontractors had complied with the requirements 20 despite the fact that
they had each sent only one copy of the lien affidavits to the owner, 12 the
115. Id. at 631. Reliable attempted to prove that it had a first lien by tracing its lien to a
deed of trust held by Texas First Mortgage REIT and to a vendor's lien retained in the deed
of the property. The doctrine of equitable subrogation allows a lender to be subrogated to a
prior lien if the funds it loans are used to pay off the debt secured by the prior lien. See
Providence Inst. for Sav. v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1969) (holder of second deed of trust
who advanced loan proceeds to holder of first deed found subrogated to lien of holder of
first deed).
116. 607 S.W.2d at 631.
117. 616 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ granted).
118. Id. at 956.
119. Id. at 956-57. The amounts awarded were to come from the money placed in the
court's registry rather than foreclosure of any liens.
120. Id. at 957. The Hardeman Act provides protection for subcontractors by requiring
the owner to withhold funds due to the contractor after the subcontractor files a lien affidavit
and notifies the owner, and, further, the owner is required to withhold 10% of the contract
price or value of the work. Id. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5453, 5463, 5469
(Vernon Supp. 1982).
121. 616 S.W.2d at 957. The statute requires that two copies be sent. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5453(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The court, however, found one copy to be
sufficient because the owner actually received it and was not prejudiced in any way. 616
S.W.2d at 957 (quoting Hunt Developers, Inc. v. Western Steel Co., 409 S.W.2d 443, 449
(Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1966, no writ) which stated: "The Legislature did not in-
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affidavits were sent by ordinary mail, 122 and the invoices were not at-
tached. 23 The owner and bank also contended that the liens were inferior
to the bank's liens. Distinguishing Sledge from those involving a holder in
due course,' 24 the court concluded that because the notes and liens were
assigned rather than negotiated by endorsement and because the owner
had no notice of the assignment, the subcontractors could perfect their
liens.125 The court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 126
The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ in Sledge, 127 and that decision
will be reported in next year's Survey.
B. Constitutional Lien
The case of San Antonio Bank & Trust Co. v. Anel, Inc. 128 involved the
issue of whether a contractor had waived its constitutional lien.' 29 InAnel
a bank provided interim construction financing for a condominium pro-
ject. Upon the failure of the owner to pay the contractor for work per-
formed, the contractor and the bank entered into a written agreement
providing that if the bank took over the property by foreclosure, the con-
tractor would receive an approximately four percent ownership interest in
the property for completing the work. Work progressed but the owner
eventually refused to approve the contractor's last draw request and the
owner thereafter declared bankruptcy. Consequently, the bank foreclosed
its liens and purchased the property at the trustee's sale.130 The contractor
sued the bank, claiming a constitutional mechanic's and materialman's
lien on the property. The trial court, finding for the contractor, ordered
the lien forclosed and property sold. The bank appealed, asserting that the
contractor had waived its constitutional lien when it entered into the par-
ticipation agreement with the bank. 13 The court of civil appeals con-
tend that the materialman should loose his lien through the technicalities of a warning,
where the owner was not misled to his prejudice.").
122. 616 S.W.2d at 957. When the notice is actually received, the method of delivery is
immaterial. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5456(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
123. 616 S.W.2d at 958. Article 5455 requires only a general statement of the nature of
the invoices while article 5453(2) requires a specific statement. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. arts. 5453, 5455 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
124. 616 S.W.2d at 958. The bank and owner were relying on case law such as McCutch-
eon v. Union Mercantile Co., 267 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-el Paso 1954, writ ref'd) that
provided that a subcontractor could not fix a lien after an original contractor had negotiated
the notes and liens to a holder in due course because the owner no longer owed the contrac-
tor, and a subcontractor could only have a lien claim through his contractor. 616 S.W.2d at
958.
125. 616 S.W.2d at 958-59.
126. Id. at 959.
127. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 115 (January 6, 1982).
128. 613 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37 provides that mechanics, artisans, and materialmen
shall have a lien on the building or materials made by their labors or with their materials for
the value of their labor or materials.
130. 613 S.W.2d at 57. The bankruptcy court abandoned the project because no equity
existed for the unsecured creditors; thus, the bank was allowed to foreclose. Id.
131. Id. See Shirley-Self Motor Co. v. Simpson, 195 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1946, no writ) (recognizing rule that constitutional lien may be waived by inconsis-
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cluded that the contractor's not attempting to perfect his statutory liens
and entering into the participation agreement was inconsistent with his
subsequent claim of a constitutional lien.' 32 Further, the court found that
even though the constitutional lien was not expressly waived, the contrac-
tor's agreement constituted an election of remedies.' 33 The court, there-
fore, concluded that the contractor had waived its constitutional lien.'
34
The court of civil appeals also considered a subcontractor's claim of a
constitutional lien in Contract Sales Co. v. Skaggs.135 In Skaggs the sub-
contractor agreed to install floor covering in a house owned by the contrac-
tor. The contractor sold the house around the same time the work was
done. When the contractor refused to pay for the flooring the subcontrac-
tor sued him for payment and sued the new owner to foreclose the statu-
tory and constitutional mechanic's and materialman's lien. The court of
civil appeals held that the subcontractor had a valid constitutional lien
because the contractor was the owner at the time the subcontractor com-
menced the work, the work was actually done, the money was owed,' 36
and the new owner had not pled that he was a bona fide purchaser.' 37
tent action); Nystel v. Gully, 257 S.W. 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1923, no writ)
(lienholder's agreement to allow owner to sell property held to be waiver of lien); DeBruin v.
Santo Domingo Land & Irrigation Co., 194 S.W. 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917,
writ refd) (filing of chattel mortgage instead of perfecting constitutional mechanic's lien
amounted to waiver of lien). But see Jones v. White, 72 Tex. 316, 12 S.W. 179 (1888) (with-
out express agreement acceptance of drafts did not waive lien); Dillard v. McGinty, 17
S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, no writ) (intent to waive must be clear); Jines
v. Dodson, 279 S.W. 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1926, writ ref'd) (lien not waived by
taking additional security). See generally 36 TEx. JUR. 2D Liens § 24 (1962).
132. 613 S.W.2d at 58-59. The court quoted Nystel v. Gully, 257 S.W. 286 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1923, no writ):
We are therefore of the opinion that the rule of law announced by numerous
authorities, which held that where one enters into a contract, the complete
performance of which, according to its true intent and terms, is inconsistent
with the existence of a lien given by law, he thereby foregoes and waives the
lien which the law would otherwise give him, is a correct one and applies in
this case.
Id. at 288.
133. 613 S.W.2d at 58.
134. Id.
135. 612 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
136. Id. at 653-54. The court stated that, "a constitutional mechanic's lien is self-execut-
ing as between the contractor and the owner and is enforceable against the owner whether or
not there be notice to the owner or compliance with any statutory requisite." Id.
137. Id. at 653. The court noted that a constitutional lien may not be enforced against a
bona fide purchaser who has no notice of the lien. Id. See Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex
Mortgage Co., 446 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969), afl'd, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.
1971) (builder's constitutional mechanic's lien held inferior to lien of mortgagee who had no
notice); Continental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (lien of mortgagee without notice of prior constitu-
tional artisan's lien held superior); Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Operators' Oil & Gas Co.,
37 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ dism'd) (when constitutional lien not
filed and no actual notice, subsequent purchaser not bound by lien). Furthermore, the bona
fide purchaser status is an affirmative defense and must be supported by pleading and proof.
612 S.W.2d at 653. See Valley Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Valley State Bank, 227 S.W.2d
231 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, no writ) (contractor's allegation that bank claim
inferior not sufficient to raise bank's defense of bona fide purchaser); Kurz v. Soliz, 231 S.W.
424 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1921, no writ) (although purchaser could prove inno-
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Finding a valid constitutional lien, the court did not address the statutory
lien. 138
C. Whirlpool Doctrine
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals decision in
Exchange Savings & Loan Association v. Monocrete Ply. Ltd 139 that was
reported in last year's Survey article. 140 In Monocrete a roofing company
provided and installed concrete roofing tiles on several condominiums.
Thereafter, the company properly perfected a Hardeman Act mechanic's
and materialman's lien.' 4 1 The holder of the prior deed of trust lien fore-
closed and purchased the condominium development at the trustee's sale.
At the trial level, the court held that the roof tiles could not be removed
without material injury. The mechanic's and materialman's lien, being
inferior to the deed of trust, was therefore extinguished. The court of civil
appeals reversed, holding that the tiles could be removed without material
injury and, applying an "economic benefit" test, found that the material-
man could benefit from the removal. 142 Under the court's economic bene-
fit test, if the materialman could remove the tiles and gain an economic
benefit and there was no other evidence of material injury, the removal
would be allowed. 14 3 Citing to its decision in First National Bank v. Whirl-
pool,144 the Texas Supreme Court stated that a materialman's lien would
be superior to a prior recorded deed of trust if the materials "can be re-
moved without material injury to (1) the land, (2) the pre-existing im-
provements, or (3) the materials themselves."' 145 The court determined
that the proper inquiry should be whether removal caused a material in-
jury to existing structure or roof tiles. 146 Furthermore, the court stated that
the effect of removal upon the prior lien's security was pertinent to a deci-
sion allowing removal. 147 In addition, the court listed several factors that
could be considered in reaching a decision.' 48 Ultimately, the court held
cence of prior lien, failure to plead such issue precluded that defense). The court also indi-
cated that the purchaser had actual knowledge of the work performed by the subcontractor.
612 S.W.2d at 653 (citing Inman v. Clark, 485 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1972, no writ) (owners of townhouse who saw painters working had actual notice of
the work performed under the lien)).
138. 612 S.W.2d at 654.
139. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 133 (Jan. 16, 1982). See 601 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980).
140. Brannian, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 39, 82 (1981).
141. Tax. REV. Cir. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452-5506a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
142. 601 S.W.2d 448, 452-53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980).
143. Id.
144. 517 S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex. 1974).
145. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 134.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The factors the court listed included:
mhe manner and extent of attachment to the land or existing improvements;
the extent to which removal would necessitate repairs, modification and/or
protection of the land or existing improvements; the stage of completion of
improvements under construction at the time removal is sought; the effect re-
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that removal of the roof tiles would cause a material injury to the existing
improvements as a matter of law because the tiles were an integral part of
the building and were necessary to keep out the elements. m49 The court
noted, however, that the materialman would be protected to the extent of
the statutorily required ten percent retainage.150 Although not reaching
the point of injury to the tiles themselves, the court disapproved of the
economic benefit test applied by the court of civil appeals, stating that a
determination of economic benefit was neither necessary nor a part of the
material injury test.' 5 ' Instead, the court stated that the test to be applied
was whether the removal would materially injure the tiles.1 52
D. Substantial Performance
The case of BPR Construction & Engineering, Inc. v. Rivers 15 3 involved
the proper placing of the burden of proof of the cost of completion for a
recovery under the equitable doctrine of substantial performance. In Riv-
ers the homeowner sued the contractor for failure to perform a home re-
pair construction contract in a workmanlike manner; the contractor
generally denied and claimed in the alternative that he had substantially
performed the contract. Additionally, the homeowner sued for removal of
the contractor's mechanic's lien. After a jury finding that the contractor
had not completed the contract but that he had substantially performed,
the trial court granted a take nothing judgment for both parties and re-
moved the mechanic's lien. At trial, neither the contractor nor the home-
owner introduced any evidence to establish the cost of completion of the
contract. The contractor appealed, claiming that the trial court had incor-
rectly placed the burden on it to prove the cost of completion in order to
recover for substantial performance. Relying on the case of Atkinson v.
Jackson Brothers,154 the court of civil appeals held that the burden was
moval may have on habitability or use of the existing improvements; and the
function of the improvements sought to be removed.
Id.
149. Id. The court noted that several cases allowed removal. First Nat'l Bank v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974) (dishwashers and disposals); Richard H. Sikes, Inc.
v. L & N Consultants, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.)
(carpets, appliances, air conditioning and heating component, smoke detectors, burglar
alarms, light fixtures and doorlocks); Parkdale State Bank v. McCord, 428 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (entire structure removable from founda-
tion); Mogul Producing & Ref. Co. v. Southern Engine & Pump Co., 244 S.W. 212 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1922, no writ) (pumps attached to existing machinery and
foundation).
150. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 134-35; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459 (Vernon Supp.
1982).
151. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 135.
152. Id. A materialman can, therefore, remove an item even if it has no economic value
to him so long as he can meet the material injury test requirements.
153. 608 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154. 270 S.W. 848 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, holding. approved). In Atkinson the com-
mission recognized the doctrine of substantial performance but determined that it was a
claim of recovery made by the contractor and, therefore, the contractor was required to
provide the evidence to compute the reduction in the contract price for defects and omis-
sions. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Jasper Elec. Serv. Co., 414 F.2d 8, 15 (5th Cir. 1969);
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properly placed on the contractor to prove the damages in order to estab-
lish recovery under substantial performance.' 55 Because the jury found
that the contract had been substantially performed rather than fully per-
formed, the contractor could not recover the full contract price.' 56 Addi-
tionally, the contractor could not recover the value of its work under
substantial performance without proof of the measure of deviation from
the plans and specifications. 57 The court also upheld the removal of the
lien because no money was owed to the contractor1 58 While concurring
with the majority opinion, Chief Justice Guittard and Justice Robertson,
in separate opinions, disagreed with the holding in Atkinson. 59 The jus-
tices contended that requiring a contractor to prove the cost of remedying
the defects placed him in an awkward position since he must prove that he
did not comply with the contract and thereby would loose his claim of full
compliance or risk forfeiture of all compensation.' 60 Certainly, the better
rule in a substantial performance situation would be to require each party
to prove its claim. 16'
E. Miscellaneous Cases
Attorney's Fees. In Bettye-Jen, Inc. v. Riley the court of civil appeals up-
held the trial court's award of attorney's fees granted to an owner who was
sued by an unpaid materialman after the contractor had paid the subcon-
tractor, the owner had paid the full contract price, and the contractor had
executed an affidavit swearing that all subcontractors and materialmen
had been paid.' 62 The court found the contractor liable by way of indem-
nity for payment of the owner's attorney's fees because of the original con-
tractor's duty to defend suits under article 5463 despite the fact that the
materialman had taken a nonsuit.' 63
Guittard, Building Contracts.- Damages and Restitution, 32 TEx. B.J. 91, 122 (1969). See also
Graham Construction Co. v. Robert H. Pyle, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref'd n.r.c.); Treiber v. Schaeffer, 416 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1967, no writ).




159. Id. at 250-52.
160. Id.
161. In his concurring opinion Justice Robertson cites decisions in other jurisdictions
that require the owner to prove his damages. See id. Justice Robertson also cited Edwards &
Blissard, 440 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Sharp
v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131, 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ
refed n.r.e.) for the general rule that each party must prove its own claim. Justice Robertson
concluded that "[t]he rule of Atkinson effectively abrogates the equitable doctrine of sub-
stantial performance." 608 S.W.2d at 252 (emphasis in original). See 3A A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 710, at 343 (1960).
162. 614 S.W.2d 623, 624-25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
163. Id. at 624. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5463 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
When an affidavit claiming a lien is filed by any one other than the original
contractor under the provisions of this Act, the original contractor shall de-
fend the action brought thereupon at his own expense. In case of judgment
against the owner or his property upon the lien, he shall be entitled to deduct
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Trust Funds. The court of civil appeals, in Jensen v. First City National
Bank,' 64 considered the application of article 5472e that provides that
funds paid to a contractor under a construction contract are trust funds for
the payment of subcontractors.1 65 In Jensen a subcontractor filed suit
against a bank, claiming that the bank converted funds belonging to him
by applying funds that were received by the contractor for payment of the
subcontract work to another debt of the contractor.166 The bank applied
the funds it received for the construction to another debt of the contractor
because the debt was secured by a security interest in the contractor's ac-
counts receivable. The court found that the statute that creates a trust fund
for subcontractors and makes it unlawful to divert the funds expressly ex-
empts the bank from liability. 167 The court, therefore, affirmed the trial
court's decision against the subcontractor. 68
F Avoidance in Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy judge in In re Boots Builders, Inc. avoided a mechanic's
lien for the installation of an air conditioning system in the debtor's house
because the lien was not properly perfected. 69 The bankruptcy court held
that although the contractor had filed a lien affidavit within the 120-day
period prescribed by article 5453,170 the description in the affidavit was
insufficient to establish a valid lien.' 7 ' An additional lien affidavit con-
taining a corrected description also did not create a valid lien because it
was fied after the statutory period had passed. 172 The bankruptcy court
also held that the contractor did not have a constitutional lien because the
trustee and the debtor were considered bona fide purchasers under federal
law and, under Texas law, a bona fide purchaser is not subject to a consti-
tutional lien. 173 In addition, the court determined that the Whirlpool doc-
from the amount due the contractor the amount of said judgment and costs;
and, if he shall have settled with the contractor in full, he shall be entitled to
recover from the contractor any amount so paid for which the contractor was
originally liable.
164. 616 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981 writ refd n.r.e.).
165. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e (Vernon Supp. 1982).
166. The subcontractor alleged that the funds were trust funds under article 5472e and
that the bank had violated the statute by applying the money to the contractor's debt rather
than holding the funds in trust for payment of the subcontractors. 616 S.W.2d at 454.
167. Id. at 454. Section 4 of article 5472e specifically provides, "This Act shall have no
application to any bank, savings and loan association or other lender ... in connection with
any transaction to which this Act is applicable." TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e(Vernon Supp. 1982).
168. 616 S.W.2d at 454.
169. 11 Bankr. 635, 639 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981). By avoiding the lien, the court would
treat the mechanic/materialman as a general rather than a secured creditor. See 11 U.S.C.§ 546(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
170. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
171. 11 Bankr. at 638-39. The description in fact described a different piece of property.
Id. at 639. See Myers v. Houston, 88 Tex. 126, 30 S.W. 912 (1895); Scholes v. Hughes, 77
Tex. 482, 14 S.W. 148 (1890).
172. 11 Bankr. at 638-89.
173. Id. (citing Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896); Lyon v. Elser, 72 Tex.
304, 12 S.W. 177 (1888)).
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trine would not apply to allow the contractor to remove the air
conditioning equipment because the contractor had not properly perfected
its statutory lien which was a prerequisite to removal under the Whir/ool
doctrine. 174 Finally, the court determined that the equipment was not per-
sonalty, therefore, the contractor was not entitled to a constitutional
lien. 75 The court, therefore, concluded that the contractor did not have a
statutory or constitutional lien on the property.' 76
III. FORECLOSURE
In Valley v. Patterson'77 the property owners appealed the trial court's
denial of a temporary injunction to prevent the trustee under the deed of
trust given on the property from selling the property at a foreclosure sale.
The Corpus Christi court of civil appeals granted an injunction to preserve
jurisdiction and the subject matter of the appeal.' 78 The note secured by
the deed of trust in Valley called for installments due on the 5th of every
month. The January 5th installment was made on January 6th, but was
accepted by the noteholder. The following month the payment was not
received bythe noteholder until the 1 th. On the 9th, the trustee, who was
also a payee under the note, sent a telegram notifying the owners that the
payment had not been made, the debt was being accelerated, and that the
entire amount was due and payable immediately. Additionally on the 9th,
the trustee mailed a letter with a copy of the notice of foreclosure sale to
the debtors, stating that the property would be sold on the 3rd of the next
month unless the entire debt was paid before that time. The letter and
notice were received by the owners on the 11th. On appeal, the owners
argued that the trustee had not complied with article 3810179 since they did
not receive the notice 21 days prior to the sale. The court of civil appeals
disagreed, finding that the statute clearly provided that the date of deposit-
ing the notice in the mails was the controlling date, not the date of re-
174. 11 Bankr. at 639. See First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.
1974).
175. 11 Bankr. at 639-41. The contractor argued that the equipment was personalty be-
cause it was easily removable and further it was "made" as required by the constitutional
lien provisions. The contractor, therefore, argued that it had a constitutional lien because
such a lien did not require the compliance with the Hardeman Act. Id. at 639.
176. Id. at 641.
177. 614 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981 no writ).
178. Id. at 869-70.
179. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
In addition, the holder of the debt to which the power is related shall at least
21 days preceding the date of sale serve written notice of the proposed sale by
Certified Mail on each debtor obligated to pay such debt according to the
records of such holder. Service of such notice shall be completed upon deposit
of the notice, enclosed in a postpaid wrapper, properly addressed to such
debtor at the most recent address as shown by the records of the holder of the
debt, in a post office or official depository under the care and custody of the
United States Postal Service. The affidavit of any person having knowledge of
the facts to the effect that such service was completed shall be prima facie
evidence of the fact of service.
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ceipt. I80 The owners also alleged that the note had not been properly
accelerated in that the trustee failed to first demand payment of the late
installment. The court noted that the rule requiring demand of the late
installment prior to the acceleration of the debt' 8' was inapplicable be-
cause the deed of trust contained an express provision whereby the owners
waived "all notices, demands for payment, presentations for payment, no-
tices of intention to accelerate the maturity protest and notice of protest, as
to this note and as to each, every and all installments."' 82 Furthermore,
the court distinguished the line of cases calling for the demand because in
those cases there was no evidence as to any such waiver.' 83 In addition,
finding no evidence of partiality, the court found no merit in the owner's
contention that the trustee could not act impartially because he was a co-
payee of the note.' 84 Moreover, the court noted that a mortgagee may act
as a trustee and purchase the property at the foreclosure sale.' 85 Lastly,
the owners claimed that the trustee had waived his right to accelerate the
note for late payment by accepting late payments in the past. The court
distinguished the cases that have held that a noteholder has waived his
right to accelerate by accepting late payments, finding that in those cases
there had been the acceptance of numerous late payments. 8 6 In the in-
stant case, the court held that the acceptance of one late payment was not
sufficient to constitute a waiver of the right to demand timely payment.'
8 7
Finding that there was no evidence that the late payments were the result
of accident, mistake, or inequitable conduct by the trustee, the court dis-




During the survey period the Texas Supreme Court considered, in Lido
180. 614 S.W.2d at 871 (citing Texas Real Estate Comm'n v. Howard, 538 S.W.2d 429
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston fst Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Johnson Serv. Co. v. Climate
Control Contractors, Inc., 478 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ)).
181. The court quoted the rules: "Where the acceleration clause in a promissory note
leaves it optional with the holder whether he shall declare the whole amount due upon
failure to pay any installment of principal or interest, such holder cannot without present-
ment for payment, exercise this option to declare the whole amount due." 614 S.W.2d at
871.
182. Id. at 871-72. Accord Donaldson v. Mansel, 615 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. Alp.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ) (no demand necessary when there is an express waiver).
183. 614 S.W.2d at 872.
184. Id. at 872. See Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1977) (stating rule that
trustee must act impartially); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.
1962) (trustee's sale set aside when trustee rejected highest bid but accepted bid of other
trustee).
185. 614 S.W.2d at 872.
186. Id. (distinguishing, McGowan v. Pasol, 605 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ); In re Marriage of Rutherford, 573 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1978, no writ); Vaughan v. Crown Plumbing & Sewer Serv., Inc., 523 S.W.2d 72
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.)).




International, Inc. v. Lambeth,189 an appeal from a summary judgment
against a mortgagor who sought to have a trustee's sale set aside on the
grounds that the mortgagee had not complied with the notice requirements
of article 3810.190 In Lido the mortgagee accelerated the debt and sold the
property at a trustee's sale while the mortgagor, an Iranian national, was
out of the country. According to the summary judgment evidence, notice
of the sale was sent only to the address contained in the deed of trust. An
affidavit of the debtor, however, alleged that prior to leaving for Iran he
had given the mortgagee his address in Iran and the local address of his
interpreter, and had arranged for payment of the debt during his absence.
In reaching its decision, the court noted that article 3810 required notice to
be sent to "the most recent address as shown by the records of the holder
of the debt."' 9 ' The supreme court, therefore, reversed the summary judg-
ment finding that the mortgagor's affadavit raised an issue of fact as to
whether the holder of the debt had complied with the notice requirements
of article 3810.192
The court of civil appeals also considered whether a mortgagee had
complied with the notice requirements of article 3810 in Krueger v.
Swann.93 In Krueger the court held that notice sent by certified mail to
the debtor's latest address contained in the mortgagee's records was suffi-
cient compliance with the statute despite the fact that the debtor had
moved. 194 Furthermore, the court held that two other debtors were not
entitled to notice by mail because the creditor's records did not contain
their addresses, and the statute, therefore, imposed no duty on the creditor
to notify them.195
In Martinez v. Beasley196 the debtors challenged a trustee's sale of their
residence, alleging that the notice of the sale was inadequate to meet the
requirements of article 3810. The debtors claimed the notice was inade-
quate because only one letter was sent to them as Mr. and Mrs. Martinez
rather than a letter to each of them individually as debtors under the
note. 197 The court of civil appeals, approving of the decision in Hausmann
189. 611 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1982).
190. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1982) requires that notice of
the sale be sent to the debtor by certified mail at least 21 days prior to the date of the sale.
191. 611 S.W.2d at 624. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1982)
which provides:
Service of such notice shall be completed upon deposit of the notice, enclosed
in a postpaid wrapper, properly addressed to such debtor at the most recent
address as shown by the records of the holder of the debt, in a post office or
official depository under the care and custody of the United States Postal
Service.
192. 611 S.W.2d at 624.
193. 604 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
194. Id. at 457.
195. Id. The court stated that, "[t]he general purpose of the statute is to provide only aminimum level of protection for the debtor, and it provides for only constructive notice of
the foreclosure." Id.
196. 616 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
197. Id. at 690. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon, Supp. 1982) reads, "the
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v. Texas Savings & Loan Association,198 held that one letter sent by certi-
fied mail to both husband and wife at their true address complied with the
statutory notice of foreclosure requirements. 199
B. Deficiency Judgment/Choice of Law
The court of civil appeals addressed the application of a choice of law
clause in First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co. 200 In First
Commerce the note, deed of trust, and guaranty all contained clauses
which stated that Louisiana law would govern the transaction even though
the real property was located in Texas.20 Furthermore, the loan transac-
tion took place in New Orleans and the note was payable in Louisiana.
After the maker of the note defaulted, the holder foreclosed on the land
and filed suit for a deficiency. The trial court granted a summary judg-
ment for the debtor because under Louisiana law the creditor was not enti-
tled to a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale. 20 2 Finding that the
suit was related to the collection of a debt rather than the foreclosure of
Texas real estate, and finding a reasonable relation between the contract
and the chosen state of Louisiana, the court of civil appeals determined
that the express provisions calling for the application of Louisiana law
should control and affirmed the trial court's decision.20 3
C Homestead
In Tremaine v. Showalter2° 4 the plaintiff appealed an order denying his
request for a temporary injunction to prevent a foreclosure sale. Claiming
the property as his homestead, the plaintiff argued that a previous sale to
his closely held corporation was a pretended sale to enable him to mort-
gage his homestead and that a sale under the deed of trust given by the
corporation should be prevented. Upholding the trial court's denial of the
temporary injunction, the court of civil appeals found that the facts clearly
holder of the debt ... shall. ... serve written notice ... by certified mail on each debtor
obligated to pay such debt .... "
198. 585 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (one letter to hus-
band and wife was sufficient).
199. 616 S.W.2d at 690.
200. 617 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist) 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. Id. at 807. The note provided it "shall be governed by, interpreted and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Louisiana." Id. The deed of trust provided:
The loan, the payment of the note evidencing same being secured hereby, is a
Louisiana transaction. This Deed of Trust and the note and related loan doc-
uments have been executed and delivered in the State of Louisiana and are to
be construed under and in accordance with the laws of the State of Louisiana.
Id. The guarantee provided, "[t]he transaction for which this guarantee was required is a
Louisiana loan transaction. This guarantee shall be construed in accordance with the laws
of the State of Louisiana, and such laws shall govern the interpretation, construction and
enforcement hereof." Id.
202. See LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. arts. 2771-72 (West 1961); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:4106-:4107 (West 1968).
203. 617 S.W.2d at 808-09. The court found no overriding public policy of Texas to
prevent applying the Louisiana law. Id. at 809.
204. 613 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
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showed that the plaintiff was married to one woman but was living in the
house with another and therefore, "[t]he claim of a homestead is not main-
tainable by a man and woman living together in an unmarried state. 20 5
A Due on Sale Clause
In a case of first impression, the Amarillo court of civil appeals consid-
ered whether a "due on sale" clause contained in a deed of trust was inva-
lid as a restraint on alienation in Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Savings.2°6
In Sonny Arnold the deed of trust contained a provision that allowed the
lender the option to accelerate the entire balance of the debt upon the sale
of the mortgaged property. 20 7 In addition, the agreement expressly pro-
vided that even if the lender approved of the purchaser's credit and man-
agement ability it could require an increase in the interest rate. Upon the
sale of the mortgaged property without the lender's consent, the lender
accelerated the balance of the debt and posted the property for trustee's
sale. 20 8 Thereafter, the purchasers and seller sought a temporary injunc-
tion to enjoin the trustee's sale. The injunction was denied at the trial level
and granted by the court of appeals in order to preserve its jurisdiction.2°9
On appeal the plaintiffs contended that the due on sale clause was invalid
as an illegal restraint on alienation. In reaching its decision, the court of
civil appeals noted the differing views of other jurisdictions regarding the
205. Id. at 37. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (constitution provides for homestead for
family and for single adult); Barker v. Lee, 337 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960,
no writ); Senegar v. La Vaughan, 230 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1950, no
writ).
206. 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ granted). See generally Com-
ment, The Due-On-Sale Clause as a Reasonable Restraint on Alienation-A Proposalfor
Texas, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 514 (1976); Comment, Is The Practice OfRaising he Interest Rate
In Return For Not Exercising An Acceleration Clause On Assumption OfA Mortgage illegal
In Texas As A Restraint On Alienation? 13 S. TEX. L.J. 296 (1972). See also Jamail v. Gil-
lingwater, 612 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ) (court upheld temporary
injunction on equitable grounds preventing foreclosure sale after lender withheld consent to
sale).
207. The deed of trust provided:
TRANSFERS OF THE PROPERTY OR BENEFICIAL INTERESTS IN
BORROWER: ASSUMPTION. On sale or transfer of (i) all or any part of
the Property, or any interest therein, or (ii) beneficial interests in Borrower
... (if Borrower is not a natural person or persons but is a corporation, part-
nership, trust or other legal entity), Lender. . . may, at Lender's option, de-
clare all of the sums secured by this Instrument to be immediately due and
payable, and Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by paragraph 27 of
this Instrument. This option shall not apply in case of. . . (b) sales or trans-
fers when the transferee's creditworthiness and management ability are satis-
factory to Lender and the transferee has executed, prior to the sale or transfer,
a written assumption agreement containing such terms as Lender may require,
including, if required by Lender, an increase in the rate of interest payable
under the Note.
Id. 615 S.W.2d at 335. Paragraph 27 allows acceleration and sale by the Trustee. Id.
208. The lender had agreed to allow the purchasers to assume the debt if the interest rate
on the loan was raised from 9.75% to 10.5%. Id. at 335. The terms of the sale provided that
the buyers did not assume the debt; rather the seller remained liable and agreed to indem-
nif the buyers from any liability arising from the debt or deed of trust. Id.
209. Id. at 336.
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due on sale clause210 and discussed the holding of the California Supreme
Court in Wellenkamp v. Bank ofAmerica.2I1 The court noted that in Wel-
lenkamp the California court found that the clause was a restraint on
alienation and that it would only be enforced when the sale would result in
an impairment of the collateral or an increase in the risk of default, but not
merely to increase the lender's rate of return. 212 Unmoved by the deci-
sions in other jurisdictions, the court determined that its decision should be
reasoned from Texas decisions.213
Finding restraints on alienation to be disfavored in Texas,214 the court
noted that void restraints are generally classified as disabling restraints,
promissory restraints, or forfeiture restraints.215 In addition, an indirect
restraint was found not to come within these classes of invalid restraints.21 6
The court also found that the due on sale clause was not a direct, disabling,
promissory, or forfeiture restraint because it (1) arose to secure repayment
of a loan rather than from a grant to the debtor, (2) did not prohibit or
prevent the transfer of the property, and (3) did not create a contractual
obligation independent of and beyond the debtor's obligation to pay the
debt. 217 Moreover, the clause operated only upon the debtor's decision to
sell and, consequently, was at most an indirect restraint on alienation.218
The court, therefore, held that the due on sale clause was not an invalid
210. 615 S.W.2d at 336-37. The court cited the following cases upholding similar clauses;
Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61
Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975); Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 206 Neb. 469, 293
N.W.2d 843 (1980); Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Century Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976).
The court cited the following cases that support the view that the clause is invalid: Patton
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978); Baltimore Life Ins. Co.
v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), appeal denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322
(1972); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972);
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
See generally Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 713 (1976).
211. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
212. 615 S.W.2d at 337.
213. 615 S.W.2d at 338.
214. Id. (citing Citizens State Bank v. O'Leary, 140 Tex. 345, 350-51, 167 S.W.2d 719,
721 (1942)).
215. 615 S.W.2d at 338. A restraint on alienation is defined as follows:
(1) A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is used in this Restatement, is an
attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause a later con-
veyance (a) to be void; or (b) to impose contractual liability on the one who
makes the later conveyance when such liability results from a breach of an
agreement not to convey; or (c) to terminate or subject to termination all or
part of the property interest conveyed.
(2) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1),
Clause (a), it is a disabling restraint.
(3) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1),
Clause (b), it is a promissory restraint.
(4) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1),
Clause (c), it is a forfeiture restraint.
615 S.W.2d 338-39 n.15 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944)).





restraint on alienation.219 Noting that the purpose of a deed of trust was
for security of the debt, the court stated: "The fact that the lender may be
motivated to consent to the conveyance only to obtain an increase in the
rate of interest payable under the note does not, in our opinion, render the
security instrument any less legal."' 220 Relying on the express language of
the due on sale clause and the freedom of contract, the court concluded
that its enforcement was not limited to the protection of the security.22'
Although the clause might invoke a harsh remedy, the court noted the
parties had contracted for such a result.222 The court did, however, recog-
nize that the Texas courts would refuse to enforce such a clause under
fraudulent or inequitable conditions.223
The Austin court of civil appeals also upheld the use of a due on sale
clause in Crestview, Ltd v. Foremost Insurance Co.224 In Crestview the
clause provided:
In the event Grantors, or any owner of the Mortgaged Premises,
without first obtaining approval of Noteholder (which approval shall
not be unreasonably withheld), should sell or otherwise dispose of the
Mortgaged Premises, or any part thereof, at any time before this Deed
of Trust is fully released and discharged, Noteholder shall have the
option to declare the indebtedness hereby secured due and payable.225
The court in Crestview found the due on sale clause to be clear and une-
quivocal and therefore enforceable as written.226 Despite the inclusion of
the provision "which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld" the
court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
determination that the fact that the lender conditioned approval on either
an increase in the interest rate or a substantial reduction in capital was not
"unreasonable, unjust, inequitable or oppressive. ' 227 Furthermore, the
court found that the due on sale clause actually facilitated alienation
rather than restrained it in that without such clause a lender would only
lend at higher rates and for shorter terms.228 In his dissent, Chief Justice
Phillips reasoned that the trial court should have granted a temporary in-
junction against the trustee's sale because there were factual issues as to
whether the lender had "unreasonably withheld" its consent to the sale.229
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. See generall, East Texas Fire Ins. Co. v. Kempner, 87 Tex. 229, 27 S.W. 122
(1894) (strict adherence to terms of contract); Stahl Petroleum Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
550 S.W.2d 360, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977), af'd, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl
Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1978) (refusing to revise contract where terms were
unambiguous).
222. 615 S.W.2d at 340.
223. Id.
224. 621 S.W. 2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
225. Id. at 818.
226. Id. at 820.
227. Id. at 819.
228. Id. at 824.
229. Id. at 831-33.
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E Bankruptcy
During the survey period the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
two cases that considered whether a foreclosure sale made under a deed of
trust was a transfer that was voidable under bankruptcy law as a prefer-
ence. 230 In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co. 23 1 the debtor in
possession under chapter X1232 sought to void the foreclosure sale that was
held within one year of filing his bankruptcy petition because the sale price
was not a "fair" consideration or a "fair equivalent" under the Bankruptcy
Act.2 3 3 Refusing to set aside the sale, the district court held that the sale
price was a fair consideration and a fair equivalent. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sale price of 57.7 percent of the
fair market value of the property was not a fair equivalent. 234 The court,
therefore, declared that the foreclosure sale was voidable. 235 In addition,
the court held that the trustee's sale was a "transfer" within the definition
of the Bankruptcy Act even though the debtor had transferred the property
to the trustee by executing the deed of trust.236 The court reasoned that the
230. See Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981); Dur-
rett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). Both Abramson and Durrell
were decided under the now repealed Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
231. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
232. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended (repealed 1978). The
facts of the case occurred prior to the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act by the Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980), so the repealed Act applied.
233. The court noted the provisions of section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, which
provided:
(1) For the purpose of, and exclusively applicable to, this subdivision:...
(e) consideration given for the property or obligation of a debtor is "fair"
(1) when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor, property
is transferred ....
(2) Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within
one year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title
by or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such
transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a
debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his ac-
tual intent....
(6) A transfer made or an obligation incurred by a debtor adjudged a
bankrupt under this title, which is fraudulent under this subdivision against
creditors of such debtor having claims provable under this title, shall be null
and void against the trustee, except as to a bona fide purchaser, lienor, or
obligee for a present fair equivalent value: ... andproiidedfurther, That such
purchaser, lienor, or obligee, who without actual fraudulent intent has given a
consideration less than fair, as defined in this subdivision, for such transfer,
lien, or obligation, may retain the property, lien, or obligation as security for
repayment ...
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67d, 52 Stat. 877 (1938), as amended (repealed 1978), quoted in 621
F.2d at 202. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (Supp. IV 1980 (current version)).
234. 621 F.2d at 204. The fair market value of the property was $200,000.00 and the sale
price was $115,400.00. The court indicated that it was unable to find any decision that ap-
proved a price of less than 70 percent of market value. Id. at 203. See Schafer v. Ham-
mond, 456 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1972) (50% was not fair consideration).
235. 621 F.2d at 204.
236. Id. A transfer under the act is defined as:
(30) "Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode,
direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an inter-
est therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or
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transfer by the debtor was not final until the date of the trustee's sale.2 37
The Fifth Circuit also held a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to be a fraudu-
lent transfer under section 67(d) 238 in Abramson v. Lakewood Bank and
Trust Co. 239 The court relied on its decision and reasoning in Durrett to
conclude that the time of transfer was the time of the foreclosure sale and
not the time the deed of trust was executed. 240 Circuit Judge Thomas A.
Clark dissented in Abramson, concluding that the foreclosure sale was not
"a transfer by the debtor" because the debtor merely defaults; it is the
mortgagee who forecloses and sells the property. 241 Furthermore, Judge
Clark opined that when the deed of trust was executed more than twelve
months before the bankruptcy filing, "the power of sale is vested abso-
lutely in the mortgagee or trustee. ' 242 Lastly, Judge Clark noted that the
"cloud created over mortgages and trust deeds by making foreclosure sales
subject to being voided by a bankruptcy trustee will naturally inhibit a
purchaser other than the mortgagee from buying at foreclosure," leading
to lower prices and greater deficiency judgments.243
upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involunta-
rily, by or without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment,
payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumberance [sic], gift, security or other-
wise; the retention of a security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be
deemed a transfer suffered by such debtor.
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1(30), 52 Stat. 842 (1938) (repealed 1978), quoted at, 621 F.2d at
204. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp. IV 1980) (current definition of transfer); see generally 1
COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY 1.30, at 130.28(2)(3) (14th ed. 1967).
237. 621 F.2d at 204.
238. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67d, 52 Stat. 877 (1938) and amendments (repealed 1978).
See I l U.S.C. § 548(a) (1978) (Supp. IV 1980) (current version).
239. 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981).
240. Id. at 548-49.
241. Id. at 549.
242. Id. at 549-50.
243. Id. at 550.
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